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Abstract. Nodes that build a mobile ad-hoc network participate in a common
routing protocol in order to provide multi-hop radio communication. Routing de-
fines how control information is exchanged between nodes in order to find the
paths between communication pairs, and how data packets are relayed. Such net-
works are vulnerable to routing misbehavior, due to faulty, selfish or malicious
nodes. Misbehavior disrupts communication, or even makes it impossible in some
cases. Misbehavior detection systems aim at removing this vulnerability. For this
purpose, we use an Artificial Immune System (AIS) approach, i.e, an approach
inspired by the human immune system (HIS).
Our goal is to make an AIS that, analogously to its natural counterpart [16],
automatically learns and detects new misbehavior, but becomes tolerant to pre-
viously unseen normal behavior. We achieve this goal by adding some new AIS
concepts to those that already exist: (1) the “virtual thymus”, which provides a
dynamic description of normal behavior in the system; (2) “clustering” is a de-
cision making method that reduces the false-positive detection probability and
minimizes the time until detection; (3) we apply the “danger signal” approach,
that is recently proposed in AIS literature [5, 6] as a way to obtain feedback from
the protected system and use it for correct learning and final decisions making;
(4) we use “memory detectors”, a standard AIS solution to achieve fast secondary
response.
We implement our AIS in a network simulator and test it on two types of
misbehavior. Performance analysis shows the following effects on the detection
capabilities: (1) the virtual thymus enables the system to: (a) learn and detect mis-
behavior without use of the preliminary misbehavior-is-absent training phase, and
(b) have low false positive detections even if normal behavior changes over time;
(2) clustering and danger signal are useful for achieving low false positives; (3)
memory detectors significantly accelerate the secondary response of the system.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement: Detecting Misbehaving Nodes in DSR
Mobile ad-hoc networks are self organized networks without any infrastructure other
than end-user terminals equipped with radios. Communication beyond the transmis-
sion range is made possible by having all nodes act both as terminals and information
relays. This in turn requires that all nodes participate in a common routing protocol,
such as Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [23]. For example, people having laptops with
standard wireless radio cards can form such a network. They only have to add appropri-
ate communication software that implements the routing protocol. The problem is that
routing works well only if all nodes execute the protocol correctly, which is difcult to
guarantee in an open ad-hoc environment.
A possible reason for node misbehavior is faulty software or hardware. In classical
(non ad-hoc) networks run by operators, equipment malfunction is known to be an im-
portant source of unavailability [24]. In an ad-hoc network, where routing is performed
by user provided equipment, we expect the problem to be exacerbated. Another rea-
son for misbehavior stems from the desire to save battery power: some nodes may run
a modied code that pretends to participate in routing but, for example, does not for-
ward packets. Finally, some nodes may also be truly malicious and attempt to bring the
network down, as do Internet viruses and worms.
If a misbehaving node can be detected by its neighbors, the neighbors can exclude
it from the network by not using it as a relay and by not offering the service to it. This
improves the quality of communication service and saves resources of well-behaving
nodes. Otherwise, the network might disappear, as well-behaving nodes might lose in-
centive to participate in building and using it.
For DSR, the routing protocol that we use as an example, an extensive list of misbe-
havior is given in [9]. The normal operation of the protocol is described in Section 2.2.
In our simulation, we implement misbehaving nodes that, from time to time: 1) do not
forward data or route requests, or 2) do not respond to route requests from their own
cache.
We chose DSR as a concrete example, because it is one of the protocols being con-
sidered for standardization for mobile ad-hoc networks. There are other routing proto-
cols, and there are parts of mobile ad-hoc networks other than routing that need mis-
behavior detection, for example, the medium access control protocol. We believe the
main elements of our method would also apply there, but a detailed analysis is for fur-
ther work.
1.2 Drawbacks of Traditional Misbehavior Detection Approaches
Traditional approaches to misbehavior detection [7, 10] use the knowledge of antici-
pated misbehavior patterns and detect them by looking for specic sequences of events.
This is very efcient against misbehavior that is known in advance (at system design)
and powerful statistical algorithms can be used [11]. The problem is that these ap-
proaches miss the ability to learn about and adapt to new misbehavior. Every targeted
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misbehavior has to be imagined in advance and explicitly addressed in the detection
system.
Another traditional approach is to use anomaly detection, i.e., to look at deviation
from normal behavior statistics [8]. The method is not appropriate for the problem of
routing misbehavior detection in mobile ad-hoc networks, because normal behavior
deviates much and changes with mobility and trafc patterns.
1.3 Our Approach: Adding An AIS to The Network
The Human Immune System (HIS) proved to be very successful in protection against
different viruses, bacteria and other pathogens that cause damage to the body. It pro-
duces immune cells and educates them to detect these damaging entities and to be tol-
erant to the body’s cells. There are different conceptual and algorithmic models that
try to explain how the HIS works [17, 18, 20, 21]. Articial Immune System (AIS) ap-
proaches use these concepts and algorithms for solving analogous problems in articial
systems [26].
We use an AIS approach, as it promises to overcome constraints of traditional mis-
behavior detection approaches (Section 1.2). We map concepts and algorithms of the
HIS to a mobile ad-hoc network and build a distributed AIS system for DSR misbehav-
ior detection. Every node runs the same detection algorithm based on its own observa-
tions. The nodes also exchange signals among each other (Figure 1).
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Fig. 1. From the human IS to an AIS: Making DSR immune to node misbehavior.
In order to introduce our specic AIS approach and solutions (Section 1.5), we rst
explain existing AIS approaches and some problems that are not solved by these ap-
proaches (Section 1.4). We dene the building blocks of our AIS for routing misbehav-
ior detection and explain how the system works in Section 3. The detailed description
of the building blocks and their components is given in Section 4.
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1.4 Existing AIS Approaches and Unsolved Problems That We Address Here
Existing AISs [2528] are mainly based on what is called : self-nonself model of the
HIS, negative selection and clonal selection.
According to the self-nonself model of the HIS, the HIS cells are produced with
aim to not detect molecules and proteins that are predened (in the thymus) to belong
to the body and body’s cells (self), and to detect all the other molecules and proteins
(nonself), including those on viruses, bacteria and other pathogens.
AIS analogs of the HIS cells are called detectors. A randomly produced detector can
recognize one or more elements from an observable universe. For example, a universe
is any possible behavior that can be observed for network nodes. A self-nonself-model-
based AIS predenes one part of the observable universe to be self (normal behavior of
network nodes, for example). Then it produces the detectors with aim to detect all other
elements of the universe, but to not detect those from the self part [3]. The detectors
are produced in the process of negative selection: they are generated at random, those
that can detect self examples are deleted, and the others are used for the detection. Such
detectors are more or less self tolerant, depending on how well self is described by the
predened self examples and whether self is noisy and changing with time. Because
of their random nature, the detectors have good coverage of nonself, even if nonself is
unknown or changing with time.
Negative selection alone is in fact an anomaly detection method. The addition of
clonal selection and memory [1214, 2] provides AISs with ability to adapt to the expe-
rienced nonself and to detect it faster and with lower false positives in the future. Clonal
selection multiplicates and renes (using random modications) the detectors that are
useful in detections. Detectors that become very specic to the experienced nonself be-
come memory. Memory detectors are long lived and can more easily detect repeated
nonself for which they are specic (fast secondary response).
Recently, the use of the danger signal model of the HIS has been proposed in the AIS
literature [5, 6]. The main idea is to generate a Danger Signal (DS), which correlates the
damage experienced by the system to be protected with observed antigens (an antigen
is a part of a self or nonself element that can be observed and potentially matched by
a detector), and to use this signal as an additional control required by detectors for
detection and for clonal selection. This additional control is aimed at decreasing false
positive detections.
There are still some fundamental problems to be solved in AIS approaches:
Eliminating need for preliminary learning in protected environment. Most of
the AISs require a set of self examples to be collected in advance in order to start
producing detectors. To collect self examples, the system to be protected must be run
in a protected environment, in which nonself is not present. In most of the cases in
practice, such a protected environment is either inconvenient or impossible to provide.
Capability to learn changing self. Even if an initial set of self examples is avail-
able, but a dynamic updating of this set is not provided, AISs will not operate correctly
if self changes over time. The problem is that detectors produced in the process of neg-
ative selection will be self-reactive. False positives caused by these detectors can be
decreased by requiring the existence of a correlated danger signal in order to have de-
tection, but this makes AISs more sensitive to the wrong danger signals. Fully reliable
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danger signals are often difcult to nd in concrete AIS applications, which is probably
the reason why the danger signal is only proposed but yet not used in the literature.
This would especially be the issue in distributed environments, for example in our mis-
behavior detection problem. For reliable low false-positives detection, both successful
dynamic description of self and danger signal should be used.
The problem of dynamic providing of self examples is not solved in the related
literature. The only known system that provides dynamic description of self is that
of Somayaji and Forrest [4]. Their system achieves tolerance to new normal behavior
in an autonomous way, but it works only under the assumption that new misbehavior
always shows new patterns that are more grouped in time than new patterns of normal
behavior; if the patterns of a new misbehavior are rst sparsely introduced in the system,
the system will become tolerant to that misbehavior. For their concrete application, as
well as for many other AIS applications, such an assumption does not hold.
Kim and Bentley [1214] dene and investigate in detail the dynamic clonal se-
lection algorithm. They show that the algorithm enables an AIS to learn changing self
if the examples of the current self are provided, but they do not tackle the problem of
providing the self examples. We believe that adding a component to an AIS that solves
this problem would enable the AIS to autonomously learn about and defend a changing
protected system.
Mapping from matching to detection. Matching between an antigen and an an-
tibody is not enough to cause detection and reaction in the HIS [18, 19] (antigens are
proteins that cover the surface of self and nonself cells; antibodies are proteins produced
by the HIS, capable of chemically binding to nonself antigens). The clustering of the
matches on the surface of an immune cell and an additional danger signal are required
for detection. These additional requirements can be viewed as detection control mech-
anisms aimed at decreasing false positives. These mechanisms are still not appropriate
in existing AISs. The high false-positives detection rate is a common unsolved problem
of many AISs, although it seems not to be so with the HIS.
1.5 Our AIS Approach for Protecting Dynamic Self
Our goal is to make an AIS that, analogously to its natural counterpart [16], automati-
cally learns and detects both already encountered and new nonself, but becomes tolerant
to any previously unseen self.
Our AIS learns the dynamic self, produces the detectors and does the detection
using four AIS concepts: virtual thymus, clustering, danger signal and memory
detectors.
Virtual Thymus. Virtual Thymus (VT) is a novel concept that we introduce in
this paper. It uses observed antigens and generated DSs (the concept of the DS is dened
below) and continuously provides self antigen examples that represent the dynamic self
of the protected system. It solves the problem of learning a changing self and eliminates
the need for a preliminary training in a protected environment. Apart from the negative
selection, the way our VT works does not have analog in the existing theories of the
HIS. It is important to mention that it is not yet clear to the immunologists how the
repertoire of the antigens presented in the thymus during negative selection is formed
(see Section 2.1).
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Clustering. Clustering is also a novel concept that we introduce in this paper. It
maps matches between the detectors and antigens into the detection decisions in a
way that constrains false-positive detection probability and minimizes the time until
detection under this constraint. The term clustering comes from immunology, where
it denotes grouping of matches between antibodies and antigens that is required for
recognition of a pathogen.
Danger Signal. The Danger Signal (DS) is generated when there is a damage to
the protected system. It correlates the damage with the antigens that are in some sense
close to the damage, showing that these antigens might be the cause for the damage.
We use the DS as a control mechanism for the detection and clonal selection, with the
aim to decrease the false positives, which is already proposed but not implemented in
the existing AISs. This use of the DS, and the way how it is generated is analogous
to the DS and Antigen Presenting Cells (APC) in Matzinger’s model [16] of the HIS.
As mentioned above, we also use the DS to implement VT, which is a novel use of the
DS. We have to mention that this use of the DS doesn’t have its analog in the existing
theories and models of the HIS.
Memory Detectors. As already mentioned in Section 1.4, the detectors that prove
useful in the detection undergo the clonal selection process and become memory. They
provide a fast response to the already experienced nonself. Clonal selection and memory
detectors are well investigated in the related literature [1215].
2 BACKGROUND.
2.1 Background on the Human Immune System
The main function of the HIS is to protect the body against different types of pathogens,
such as viruses, bacteria and parasites and to clear it from debris. It consists of a large
number of different innate and acquired immune cells, which interact in order to provide
detection and elimination of the pathogens [18]. We present a HIS overview based on
the self-nonself and the danger models [18, 17].
Functional architecture of the IS. The rst line of defense of the body consists of phys-
ical barriers: skin and mucous membranes of digestive, respiratory and reproductive
tracts. It prevents the body from being entered easily by pathogens.
The innate immune system is the second line of defense. It protects the body against
common bacteria, worms and some viruses, and clears it from debris. It also interacts
with the adaptive immune system, signaling the presence of damage in self cells and
activating the adaptive IS.
The adaptive immune system educates its cells to be tolerant to the body’s cells,
but adapts them to better detect both experienced and previously unseen pathogens. It
provides an effective protection against viruses even after they enter the body cells. It
memorizes encountered viruses for more efcient and fast detection in the future.
The innate immune system consists of macrophages cells, complement proteins and
natural killer cells. Macrophages are big cells that are attracted by bacteria to engulf the
bacteria in the process called phagocytosis. Complement proteins can destroy some
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common bacteria. Natural killer cells can kill cells that do not do MHC presentation
properly. When there is an attack, the innate cells involved in the response emit signals
in order to recruit more immune system cells against the attack.
The adaptive immune system consists of two main types of lymphocyte cells. These
are B cells and T cells. Both B and T cells are covered with antibodies. Antibodies are
proteins capable of chemically binding to nonself antigens (in case of T cells, the anti-
bodies are usually called receptors, and they are never secreted from the cell). Antigens
are proteins that cover the surface of self and nonself cells.
Whether chemical binding takes place between an antibody and an antigen depends
on the complementarity of their three-dimensional chemical structures. If it does, the
antigen and the antibody are said to be cognate. Because this complementarity does
not have to be exact, an antibody may have several different cognate antigens. What
happens after binding depends on additional control signals exchanged between differ-
ent IS cells, as we explain next.
B cells repertoire. One B cell is covered by only one type of antibody, but two B cells
may have very different antibodies. As there are many B cells (about 1 billion fresh
cells are created daily by a healthy human), there is also a large number of different
antibodies at the same time. How is this diversity of antibodies created and why do
antibodies not match self antigens? The answer is in the process of creating B cells.
B cells are created from stem cells in the bone marrow by rearrangement of genes in
immature B cells. Stem cells are generic cells from which all immune cells derive.
Rearrangement of genes provides diversity of B cells. Before leaving bone marrow, B
cells have to survive negative selection in the bone marrow: if the antibodies of a B
cell match any self antigen present in the bone marrow during this phase, the cell dies.
The cells that survive are likely to be self tolerant.
T cells repertoire. B cells are not fully self tolerant, because not all self antigens are
presented in bone marrow. Self tolerance is provided by T cells that are created in the
same way as B cells, but in the thymus, the organ behind the breastbone. T cells have
good self tolerance, because almost all self antigens are presented to these cells during
negative selection in the thymus. There are two types of T cells, T helper cells (Th)
and T killer cells (CTL).
Humoral response. After some antibodies of a B cell match antigens of a pathogen or
self cell, that antigens are processed and presented on the surface of the B cell. The
presentation is done by Major-Histocompatibility-Complex molecules type II (MHC
II). If antibodies of some Th cell bind to these antigens and if the Th cell is activated,
it will give costimulation to the B cell and activate it. Some activated B cells start the
process of producing many new similar B cells, that will be able to match the pathogen
better. This process is called clonal selection. It is explained below. Another activated
B cells secret antibodies that opsonize the pathogens, marking them to be engulfed by
macrophages and eliminated. The process stops when pathogens are cleared from the
body. Some of the B cells produced in the humoral response become memory. They
are long lived and ready to react promptly to the same cognate pathogen in the future.
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If B cell did not receive the costimulation, it means that the detected antigens are
probably self antigens for which the T cells are tolerant. In this last case, the B cell will
die together with its self reactive antibodies. The costimulation to the B cells (and their
activation) can come from the innate cells as well.
B cells can secret antibodies or begin clonal selection without being costimulated,
but only in the case when matching between B cell antibodies and antigens is very
strong. This occurs with a high probability only for memory B cells. Whereas rst time
encountered pathogens require a few weeks to be learned and cleared by the IS, the
secondary reaction by memory B cells takes usually only a few days.
Clonal Selection. In the clonal selection phase, a B cell divides into a number of clones
with similar but not strictly identical antibodies. Statistically, some clones will match
the pathogen that triggered the clonal selection better than the original B cells and some
will match it worse. If the pathogens whose antigens triggered clonal selection are still
present, they will continue to trigger cloning new B cells that match the pathogen well.
The process continues reproducing B cells more and more specic to present pathogens.
B cells that are specic enough become memory B cells and do not need costimulation.
This is a process with positive feedback and it produces a large number of B cells
specic to the presented pathogen.
Cellular Response. This is the response by CTL cells against pathogens that manage
to enter body’s cells, i.e. against viruses. MHC type I molecules of a body cell sample
and present antigens that are inside the cell. If these antigens are recognized by CTL
receptors, and if there is a Th cell that costimulates this antigen recognition, CTL is
activated and it governs the infected body cell to die. Activated CTLs proliferate and
respond to the viruses. Most of the CTL cells are programmed and die after doing their
job, but some of them become memory CTLs. Memory CTLs are long lived, do not
require costimulation by Th cells in order to be activated, and produce fast secondary
response to the reinfection by the same or similar virus.
Clustering. Recognition of a pathogen by a B or CTL cell requires that the antibodies
(receptors) of these cells bind not only one but more antigens from the pathogen si-
multaneously. This is called clustering. It provides some robustness to false antibody-
antigen binding.
The Danger Signal is a control used for activating Th cells, the cells that control ac-
tivation of non-memory B and CTL cells. The danger signal (DS) is generated when
there is some damage to self cells, which is usually due to pathogens. As an example,
the DS is generated when a cell dies before being old; the cell debris are different when
a cell dies of old age or when it is killed by a pathogen. DS is transported to Th by
antigen presenting cells (APC). An APC transports some information about antigens
found around the place of the damage (that potentiality belong to the pathogen). This
information instructs Th cells to costimulate those B or CTL cells that has recognized
similar antigens.
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Self Presented in The Thymus. The way how the self is provided that is presented during
negative selection in the thymus is still an open question in biological research ([18],
pages 85-87; [19]): (1) both self and non-self antigens are presented in the thymus;
the rules about how antigens can enter the thymus from the blood are unclear; (2) the
thymic dendritic cells that present antigens survive for only a few days in the thymus,
so they present current self antigens; if a non-self antigen is picked up for presentation
during an infection, it will be presented only temporarily; once the infection is cleared
from the body, freshly made antigens will no longer present the foreign antigen as self.
2.2 Background on DSR
The dynamic source routing protocol (DSR) is one of the candidate standards for rout-
ing in mobile ad-hoc networks [23]. A source route is a list of nodes that can be used
as intermediate relays to reach a destination. It is written in the data packet header at
the source; intermediate relays simply look it up to determine the next hop.
DSR species how sources discover, maintain and use source routes. To discover
a source route, a node broadcasts a route request packet. Nodes that receive a route
request add their own address in the source route collecting eld of the packet, and then
broadcast the packet, except in two cases. The rst case is if the same route request
was already received by a node; then the node discards the packet. Two received route
requests are considered to be the same if they belong to the same route discovery, which
is identied by the same value of the source, destination and sequence number elds
in the request packets. The second case is if the receiving node is the destination of
the route discovery, or if it already has a route to the destination in its cache; then
the node sends a route reply message that contains a completed source route. If links
in the network are bidirectional, the route replies are sent over the reversed collected
routes. If links are not bidirectional, the route replies are sent to the initiator of the route
discovery as included in a new route request generated by answering nodes. The source
of the initial route request is the destination of the new route requests. The node that
initiates original route request receives usually more route replies, each containing a
different route. The replies that arrive earlier than the others are expected to indicate
better routes, because for a node to send a route reply, it is required to wait rst for a
time proportional to the number of hops in the route it has as answer. If a node hears
that some neighbor node answers during this waiting time, it supposes that the route it
has is worse than the neighbor’s route, and it does not answer. This avoids route reply
storms and unnecessary overhead.
After the initiator of route discovery receives the rst route reply, it sends data over
the obtained route. While packets are sent over the route, the route is maintained, in
such a way that every node on the route is responsible for the link over which it sends
packets. If some link in the route breaks, the node that detects that it cannot send over
that link should send error messages to the source. Additionally it should salvage the
packets destined to the broken link, i.e., reroute them over alternate partial routes to the
destination.
The mechanisms just described are the basic operation of DSR. There are also some
additional mechanisms, such as gratuitous route replies, caching routes from forwarded
or overheard packets and DSR ow state extension [23].
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3 OVERVIEW OF OUR AIS
3.1 AIS Building Blocks
The four main AIS concepts that we use (Virtual Thymus, Clustering, Danger Signal
and Memory Detectors) are implemented within the six building blocks (Figure 2), at
every network node.
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Fig. 2. AIS building blocks in one network node. Note: DS(1), DS(2) and DS(3) are all the same
danger signal, indexing only emphasizes three different uses of it.
The Mapping and Danger Signal (DS) blocks are interfaces to the system to be
protected and to AISs in other nodes. The mapping block transforms observed routing
protocol events into internal AIS representation of the behavior (Antigens). The DS
block transforms the experienced degradation of the communication quality of this node
into the danger signal, and exchanges the signal with other nodes. The Virtual Thymus
(VT) uses danger signal to dynamically select self examples from the collected antigens.
It uses the selected self antigens for negative selection of the detectors produced by the
Bone Marrow block. The Clonal Selection block multiplies and renes useful detectors,
if they get costimulated by the danger signal. The Clustering block denes whether
matching between the detectors and the observed antigens results in the detection of
the corresponding node or not. The result depends on the numbers of observed and
matched antigens for that node, on the types of the detectors that matched (whether
they are memory or not), and on the presence of correlated danger signals.
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3.2 How The AIS Works.
Here we explain how the AIS works by putting a node equipped with the AIS in the
network scenarios typical for invocation of certain blocks or concepts. For the details,
please see the pseudo code of the six AIS building blocks (Appendix B) and the values
of the used parameters (Table 1 in Section 5).
Bootstrap. When a node joins the network for the rst time, it does not have any
preloaded knowledge or data examples about normal behavior or misbehavior in the
network. It starts its AIS in the initial self learning phase. In this phase the node ob-
serves antigens and uses the VT to collect self examples. It uses the DS block to provide
DSs needed for correct functioning of the VT. In this phase Clonal Selection and Clus-
tering blocks are turned off. This is done in order to avoid initial false positives until
the number of the self antigen examples stabilizes. Once the number of self examples
reaches a threshold, the node turns on the Clonal Selection and Clustering blocks, i.e.,
it enters detection phase and stays in this phase all the time. During the detection phase
the node continues to observe antigens, produce DSs, and dynamically update self ex-
amples.
If the node leaves the network and joins it again, it may start with saved self exam-
ples and enter detection phase immediately.
It is important to notice that there are no assumptions on the behavior of the other
nodes during the initial learning phase (some of them may misbehave). Also, the node
starts to participate in routing and use the network to communicate already in the initial
learning phase.
Observing Antigens. The node continuously observes routing protocol events for all its
neighbors and temporarily records them within subsequent time intervals of predened
length (a system parameter). Two nodes are neighbors if they are within radio range of
each other. Examples of protocol events are route request received, data packet received,
data packet forwarded. Protocol events collected for one neighbor within the last time
interval are compressed into a compact form, called antigen. The antigen represents the
behavior of the observed node in that time interval. The details of mapping from the
observed protocol events to the antigens are given in Section 4.1.
Generating, Transmitting and Receiving the DS. When a node communicates with
another node, it normally receives acknowledgments for its data packets, that are sent
by the destination. The danger signal is generated by a node when it experiences a
packet loss, i.e., when it does not receive the acknowledgment (packet loss is seen as a
damage to the protected system). The DS is then sent over the route on which the packet
loss took place, and received by all the nodes that can overhear it. A typical scenario is
shown on the Figure 3.
The DS contains the information about the (approximate) time of the packet loss,
and about the nodes on the route over which the lost packet was sent. So, the receivers
of the danger signal are able to correlate it with the collected antigens that are close in
time and space (on the same route) to the experienced damage (i.e. to the packet loss).
(There is a strong analogy with the HIS, regarding both the way the danger signal is
generated and the information it contains; see Section 2.1.)
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Fig. 3. Generating, transmitting and receiving the danger signal (DS): node S is sending data
packets to D over an established route; there is a packet dropped by node B; the source S of the
packet does not receive the acknowledgment from the destination D; S generates and sends the
danger signal over the route on which the loss took place; the nodes that receive the danger signal
are A, B, C and E. In this scenario, node F moves away and do not receive the danger signal.
It is possible that the DS is generated even if there is no any misbehavior, because a
packet was lost due to a excessive collision of radio signals, or break of the used route
due to the mobility, which normally happens in mobile ad hoc networks. Our system is
robust to such false DSs, as explained in the next three paragraphs.
Use of the DS in The VT: Achieving The Dynamic Self. To dene dynamic self in our
system, we extend the notion of self from the behavior specied by the routing protocol
(DSR, for example) to any interactive node behavior that does not have negative effects
on the normal network trafcking, i.e. does not cause packet losses. As a packet loss,
we count any case in which the packet does not arrive at the destination, or the acknowl-
edgment from the destination about receiving the packet does not reach the source, or
there is a high delay in any of these packets.
How the node learns the dynamic self is shown on the Figure 4.
Whenever the node observes a new antigen, it sends it towards the thymus with a
delay that is large enough to receive all the DSs that could be related to that antigen. If
none of potentiality received DSs correlates this antigen to a damage experienced in the
network, the antigen is considered as self and passed into the thymus if needed. Once
the number of self antigen examples reaches its stable value (it is the end of the initial
self learning phase), a new example is added only when an old one leaves the thymus.
Producing New Naive Detectors in VT. New naive detectors are produced in the VT
all the time in a process of dynamic negative selection.
In the initial self learning phase, new random detectors are generated by the Bone
Marrow and negatively selected with all collected self antigens. When new self antigen
is collected, all existing detectors are negatively selected only with that new self antigen.
The detectors are not used for the detection in this initial phase. Note that the method is
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Fig. 4. Virtual Thymus: Self to be used in the dynamic process of clonal selection is dynamically
collected from the observed antigens that are not correlated with any danger signal.
computationally more convenient and not more costly then collecting all self examples
and then creating and checking all the detectors.
After the initial learning phase, a new self antigen that enters the thymus is used
to negatively select only newly created immature detectors, but not those that already
passed the negative selection (and became naive).
The number of naive detectors stays approximately constant. A naive detector that
does not score enough matches to undergo clonal selection dies after a xed life time
(a parameter). In parallel, if the number of naive detectors is smaller then a maximum
value (which is a parameter), new naive detectors are generated by the negative selection
in the VT. The naive detectors that score many matches and receive costimulations by
the DSs for that matches undergo clonal selection and become memory. The detector is
rst duplicated. One copy becomes a memory detector, while another is hypermutated
and becomes new naive detector.
Finite-Time Antigen Presentation in The VT and Wrong DSs. A collected self-antigen
example is used in the VT for a nite time, then it leaves the VT and is replaced with
fresh one. This aging and continuous updating provides the VT with the current ver-
sion of the dynamic self, and makes AIS less sensitive to nonself antigens that are
mistakenly selected as self examples (because the DS was mistakenly absent). If a non-
self antigen is mistakenly picked up and used to represent self, new naive detectors that
match it will not be produced until this antigen leaves the VT. During this time period,
the detectors produced before the nonself antigen is picked up are still able to match
that and similar antigens.
Wrong DSs that are mistakenly or intentionally generated may prevent self antigen
to be used as an example. This is not a problem for the VT as there would be other
self examples that are collected. It is also possible to counteract misbehaving nodes
that try to maliciously generate many fake DSs and prevent other nodes from collecting
enough self examples (an attack to the AIS). In our case such a malicious node may
be detected because it sends too many DSs, though it should change a path that is not
14 S. Sarafijanovic´ and J. Y. Le Boudec
working for its data packets if it really has a reason to send danger signals (in current
AIS simulation this type of misbehavior is not implemented). In general, as this is a
known attack specic to VT, a specic predened detector(s) may be designed for it in
a concrete AIS.
It is important to note that the joint use of the dynamic self and danger signal
brings new quality to the robustness of the AIS: false positive matches by detectors are
partially compensated by the absence of the danger signal; temporary presence of wrong
danger signal does not cause detection if there is no corresponding false positive match-
ing by current detectors whose production was indirectly controlled by danger signals
in the past; if the danger signal is currently mistakenly absent to costimulate detection
for a nonself antigen, memory detectors for which correct education was assisted by the
danger signal in the past can do detection.
Matching. Once the detection phase starts, every new observed antigen is checked with
the existing detectors for matching. Matches for the antigens observed for one node are
temporarily stored and used for clustering and detection (next paragraph).
Clustering And Use of The DS for Detection. In order to have detection of a node
as misbehaving, our AIS requires more antigens of that node to be matched by the
detectors. After every new antigen observed for a node, the matching information is
used together with the matching information previously collected for that node within
some time window, and a decision is made if there is detection or not (we call this
clustering; the term comes from immunology, see Section 2.1).
The method is time adaptive. If most of the observed antigens are matched, fewer
observations are required for detection. The method may also be tuned to achieve a
tradeoff between probability of false-positive detection and the time until detection.
The details of the method, including the clustering formula, are given in Section 4.2. In
practice, clustering is done for the matches from the nite time window. The size of the
window can always be chosen (experimentally) large enough to cover majority of the
detection cases. Then, intuitively, the clustering formula approximately holds.
The matches by the naive detectors are clustered separately from the matches by the
memory detectors. The parameters used for the clustering differ in the two cases as well.
As the memory detectors are better educated, they require smaller number of clustered
matches for the same false positive probability, and so provide a faster detection.
Additional control for decreasing false positives is to require a correlated danger
signal for observed antigen, in order to count the matching of that antigen for clustering.
Similar methods are used in the HIS, clustering of the matches on the surface of an
immune cell and an additional danger signal are required for detection ([18, 19]).
Use of The DS for Clonal Selection: Producing Memory Detectors. The detectors
that have many matches costimulated by the danger enter the process of clonal selec-
tion. They are cloned, i.e. multiplied and randomly modied. The clones that receive
costimulation many times (above a threshold) are promoted into memory.
Use of Memory Detectors. Analogously to the HIS, our memory detectors do not re-
quire the DS to verify their matches to the antigens. Less clustering is also required for
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the detection, comparing to the naive detectors and their clones that still did not become
memory.
Memory detectors are long lived, in order to provide fast response to the experienced
misbehavior. As the number of memory detectors is limited, we keep those that are
unique. From those that are not unique, we keep last used ones. Concretely, when a
new memory detector is created and the number of the existing memory detectors is
maximum possible, we choose an old memory detector to delete as follows. We nd
existing memory detectors that are able to match certain number (that is a parameter)
of the latest antigens matched by the new detector before it became memory (these are
similar to the new memory detector), and from these we delete the one that is not used
for the longest time. If we do not nd such similar ones, then we delete the one that is
not used for the longest time among all the old detectors.
DS is not needed for matches by memory detectors to be counted for the detection.
But a systematic absence of DSs for similar antigens matched by a memory detector
means that the memory detector is probably reactive to the new self, and it is deleted.
For the details of the testing see Appendix B.
3.3 Mapping of HIS Elements to Our AIS
The elements of the natural IS used in our detection system are mapped as follows:
– Body: the entire mobile ad-hoc network.
– Self Cells: well-behaving nodes.
– Non-self Cells: misbehaving nodes.
– Antigen: (AIS) antigen, which is a sequence of observed DSR protocol events rec-
ognized. In the sequence of packet headers and represented by binary strings as
explained in Section 3.2 and with the details given in Section 4 (representation is
adopted from [14]).
– Antibody: detector; detectors are binary strings produced in the continuous pro-
cesses of negative selection and clonal selection; ideally, they match non-self
antigens (produced by misbehaving nodes) and do not match self antigens.
– Chemical binding of antibodies to antigens: matching function between detectors
and antigens, dened in detail in Section 4.
– Detection: a node detects a neighbor as misbehaving if the node’s detectors match
relatively many of the antigens produced by that neighbor (clustering) and if it
receives danger signals related to those antigens.
– Clustering: clustering of matching antibodies on the immune system cell surface is
mapped to the clustering of matches between detectors and antigens in time for a
given observed node.
– Aging of the immune cells: nite life time of the detectors
– Necrosis and apoptosis: packet loss.
– Danger signal: the danger signal in our framework contains information about the
time and nodes correlated with a packet loss.
– Antigen presenting cell: transmission of the danger signal.
– Thymus: The virtual thymus is a set of mechanisms that provide (as explained in
Section 3.2) the presentation of the current self in the system during the continuous
negative selection process.
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– Memory cells: memory detectors; detectors become memory if they prove to be
useful in detection; they differ from normal detectors by longer lifetime and lower
clustering required for detection.
4 Detailed Description of Some Building Blocks
4.1 Mapping behavior to Antigens
The mapping used here was adopted from Kim and Bentley [14].
A node in our system monitors its neighbors and collects one protocol trace per
monitored neighbor. A protocol trace consists of a series of data sets, collected on non-
overlapping intervals during the activity time of a monitored neighbor. One data set
consists of events recorded during one time interval of duration ∆t (∆t = 10s by
default), with an additional constraint to maximum Ns events per a data set (Ns = 40
by default).
Data sets are then transformed as follows. First, protocol events are mapped to a
nite set of primitives, identied with labels. In the simulation, we use the following
list:
A= RREQ sent
B= RREP sent
C= RERR sent
D= DATA sent and IP source address
is not of monitored node
E= RREQ received
F= RREP received
G= RERR received
H= DATA received and IP destination address
is not of the monitored node
A data set is then represented as a sequence of labels from the alphabet dened
above, for example
l1 = (EAFBHHEDEBHDHDHHDHD,..)
Second, a number of genes are dened. A gene is an atomic pattern used for matching.
We use the following list:
Gene1= #E in sequence
Gene2= #(E*(A or B)) in sequence
Gene3= #H in sequence
Gene4= #(H*D) in sequence
where #(’sub-pattern’) is the number of the sub-patterns ’sub-pattern’ in a sequence,
with * representing one arbitrary label or no label at all. For example, #(E*(A or B)) is
the number of sub-patterns that are two or three labels long, and that begin with E and
end with A or B. The genes are used to map a sequence such as l1 to an intermediate
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representation that gives the values of the different genes in one data set. For example,
l1 is mapped to an antigen that consists of the following four genes:
l2 =
(
3 2 7 6
)
The genes are so dened that, in the case of normal behavior, the values of different
genes are correlated to each other for some pairs of the genes. Some of the pairs lose the
correlation if they represent misbehavior. This enables differentiation between normal
behavior and misbehavior in the space of all antigens, and enables the detectors that
cover misbehavior but not normal behavior to be created.
Finally, a gene value is encoded on 10 bits as follows. The range of a gene values
that are below some threshold value is uniformly divided on 10 intervals. The position
of the interval to which the gene value belongs gives the position of the bit that is set
to 1 for the gene in the nal representation. The threshold is expected to be reached or
exceeded rarely. The values above the threshold are encoded as if they belong to the
last interval. Other bits are set to 0. For example, if the threshold value for all the four
dened genes is equal to 20, l2 is mapped to the nal antigen format:
l3 =
(
0000000010 0000000010 0000001000 0000001000
)
There is one antigen such as l3 every ∆t seconds, for every monitored node, during the
activity time of the monitored node.
4.2 Clustering
Assume we have collected n antigens for the monitored node. Let Mn be the number of
antigens (among n) that are matched by detectors. Let θmax be a bound on the proba-
bility of false-positive matching (matching a self antigen) that we are willing to accept,
i.e. the antigens of well-behaving nodes are matched by detectors with a probability
that is less or equal than θmax. We determine a good value by pilot simulation runs
(θmax = 0.06). Let α (=0.001 by default) be the false-positive detection that we target.
We detect the monitored node (classify it as misbehaving) if
Mn
n
> θmax(1 +
ξ(α)√
n
√
1− θmax
θmax
) (1)
where ξ(α) is the (1−α)-quantile of the normal distribution (for example, ξ(0.0001) =
3.72). As long as Equation (1) is not true, the node is classied as well-behaving. With
default parameter values, the condition is Mn
n
> 0.06 + 0.88√
n
. The derivation of Equa-
tion (1) is given in the Appendix A.
5 Performance Analysis
5.1 Analyzed Factors and Experiments
We analyze the effects of turning on/off complete components of the system on its
performance metrics dened in the next section. Concretely, we analyze the effects of:
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(1) substitution of the preliminary learning phase in a protected environment by the
virtual thymus, in case of stationary normal behavior; protected environment means
that misbehavior is absent from the network; (2) use of the danger signal for detection
control; (3) use of memory detectors; (4) substitution of the preliminary learning phase
in the protected environment by the virtual thymus, in the case of normal behavior
that changes with time. The changing self is implemented by increasing the amount of
the data generated by the nodes at the middle of the simulation (after 30 minutes of
simulated time).
Clustering is used in all the experiments, as we already have shown its advantage
over simple matching in [2].
The values of the system parameters used in the simulation are given in Table 1. The
same default values are used in all the experiments. We have found the default values
by pilot runs. To learn about the parameters, study the pseudo code of the AIS building
blocks (Appendix B) and how the AIS works (Section 3.2).
Table 1. AIS Parameters
Parameter Default Value
AntigenCollectionTime 10 s
DelayBufferSizeMax 1200
AntigenTowardsVTMin 70 s
StoringTimeDS 11 s
AntigPresentTimeVT 250 s
MaxNumberOfAntigensVT 1200
MaxNumberNaive 1000
MaxNaiveTime 500 s
ThresholdCS 20
ProbaPerBit 0.08
MemoryGroupingParameter 1
MemoryTestTriger 15
NumberOfTestSetsMax 30
MemoryDetTestSize 20
MemoryConfidenceMax 0.5
DetByMemoryTimeWindow 18 s
DetByNaiveTimeWindow 40 s
ThetaMemory 0.01
AlphaMemory 0.0001
ThetaNaive 0.06
AlphaNaive 0.0001
5.2 Performance Metrics
The metrics we use are: (1) time until detection of a misbehaving node; (2) true-positive
detection, in form of the distribution of the number of nodes which detect a misbehaving
node; (3) false-positive detection, in form of the distribution of the number of nodes
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which detect a well-behaving node. The metrics are chosen from a reputation system
perspective; we see the use of a reputation system [9] as a way to add a reactive part to
our AIS.
5.3 Simulation: General Settings and Assumptions
The simulation is done in Glomosim network simulator [22]. There are 40 nodes in the
simulation, of which 5-20 nodes are misbehaving. Mobility is the random way point,
speed is 1m/s, without pauses. The simulation area is 800x1000 m, and the radio range
is 355 m. A misbehaving node exhibits both types of misbehavior: 1) it does not for-
ward data packets or 2) it does not answer or forward route request messages; when a
misbehaving node has a chance to misbehave, it does it with certain probability (0.6 by
default), that is also a parameter.
Note that the clustering rule given by Equation (1) holds for an innite time simu-
lation, in which every misbehaving node is eventually detected after a long time (zero
false negatives) buy every other node in the network (because of the nite simulation
area and RWP mobility). When we stop the simulation, for every encountered and not
yet detected misbehaving node we count one false negative.
5.4 Simulation Results
All the results are average values of 20 runs, with 90 % condence intervals for the
mean values.
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Fig. 5. Use of the preliminary learning phase: (a) time until detection, (b) correct detections and
(c) misdetections.
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Fig. 6. Use of the virtual thymus instead of the preliminary learning phase: (a) time until detec-
tion, (b) correct detections and (c) misdetections.
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Fig. 7. Use of the danger signal for detection decision making: (a) time until detection, (b) correct
detections and (c) misdetections.
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Fig. 8. Use of memory detectors: (a) time until detection, (b) correct detections and (c) misdetec-
tions.
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Fig. 9. Virtual thymus versus preliminary learning phase, the effect of change of normal behavior
during the use of the AIS: (a) time until detection, (b) misdetections: preliminary learning phase,
(c) misdetections: virtual thymus.
Virtual thymus versus preliminary learning phase in the protected environment:
From the Figures 5 and 6 we see that the preliminary learning phase can be substi-
tuted by the virtual thymus. Time until detection and the false positives are similar in
both cases, while the false negatives are slightly worse in the case with the virtual thy-
mus. This result proves that VT enables the system to learn the protected system self
instead of using provided self examples.
The danger signal used for detection control has a large impact in decreasing false
positives (Figures 7(c) and 8(c)).
The use of the memory detectors signicantly decreases the time until detection
(Figure 8(a)), and also improves true-positive detection (Figures 7(b) and 8(b)). Such
impact of the memory is already shown in the related literature [13, 2]. In our case it
is the direct consequence of the lower value of the clustering parameter Θmax used for
memory detectors (compared to the naive detectors).
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Better response to evolving self: From Figure 9 we see that the VT outperforms the
solution with the preliminary learning phase in the case of self that has changed during
the simulation. For the preliminary learning phase solution, false positive probability
increased substantially and become larger then for the VT solution, when the stable
normal behavior is substituted by the normal behavior that changes in the middle of the
simulation. The reason is that with the preliminary learning phase the initial set of self
examples is continued to be used for the negative selection after the self has changed.
With VT, examples of new self are learned after the changing point, which directly
impacts the false positives.
6 Conclusions
From our results we conclude that the examined mechanisms: the virtual thymus, the
clustering, the danger signal and the use of memory detectors can be successfully ap-
plied to our problem.
The use of the virtual thymus brings two qualitative advantages compared to the
standard AIS: (1) it eliminates the need for the preliminary learning phase in the pro-
tected environment, i.e., enables use of the AIS in applications for which a protected
environment is not possible; (2) it provides the AIS with the ability to learn self that
can change with time; this provides smaller false positives comparing to the case with
preliminary training phase, as shown in our experiment (in which self changes in the
middle of the simulation).
Clustering achieves low false positives by increasing the time until detection, but
this price is paid only when a misbehavior is experienced for the rst time. The later
encounters are solved faster by the memory detectors that require less clustering.
We nd a simple danger signal in our system, and show how it is useful in control-
ling detection decisions (decrease of false positives). We also show the use of the DS to
implement the VT (the central component of our solution).
7 Discussion and Future Work
We expect that the combination of the four concepts bring some additional advantages
that have not been analyzed by the simulation.
As explained in Section 3.2, in cases of not previously seen self, the self-learning
ability of the virtual thymus should improve robustness of the self-tolerance to the
wrong danger signals, compared to the thymus with the predened self examples col-
lected in the preliminary learning phase. This feature is especially important in appli-
cations in which a reliable danger signal is difcult to provide (this is the case with our
system, see Section 3.2). The effect of wrong danger signals caused by misbehaving
nodes and impact of the VT on this effect are not experimentally evaluated here, and
it remains as future work. But we should mention that even though wrong DSs (both
missing and incorrect) are inherently present (they are not intentionally generated) in
our system, the AIS still works well.
We have dened the genes manually, in the design phase. It is possible to automate
this process by calculating the correlations of automatically generated gene-candidate
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pairs on an observed self behavior. Gene candidates can also be formed automatically
from the set of observable protocol events. Our solution for collecting self behavior
examples in an unprotected environment makes this method more promising.
As future work, we also plan to implement the automatic generating of genes, and
to better analyze the impact of joint and separate uses of the concepts used in this paper.
More detailed experimental analysis is needed to evaluate separately the effects of aging
and DS used in the VT on the AIS learning ability and dynamics. We also plan to test
the set of algorithms used in our AIS on a standard data set, for example on the data
set used in [1214], and especially evaluate impact of VT and its parameters on the
learning ability of the algorithms set.
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A Derivation of Equation (1)
We model the outcome of the behavior of a node as a random generator, such that with
unknown but xed probability θ a data set is interpreted as suspicious. We assume the
outcome of this ctitious generator is iid. We use a classical hypothesis framework.
The null hypothesis is θ ≤ θmax, i.e., the node behaves well. The maximum likelihood
ratio test has a rejection region of the form {Mn > K(n)} for some function K(n). The
function K(n) is found by the type-I error probability condition: P{Mn > K(n)}|θ) ≤
α, for all θ ≤ θmax, thus the best K(n) is obtained by solving the equation
P({Mn > K(n)}|θmax) = α
The distribution of Mn is binomial, which is well approximated by a normal distribution
with mean µ = nθ and variance nθ(1 − θ). After some algebra this gives K(n) =√
nξ
√
θmax(1− θmax) + nθmax, from which Equation (1) derives immediately.
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B Pseudo Code of The Six AIS Building Blocks
//All the blocks execute in parallel
//In our case, this is implemented using continues-time event based simulation
//Every Send() has a corresponding Receive() in another block(s)
// Mapping block
Initialize the variables;
set timerMB=0;
While (TRUE){
if (timerMB<AntigenCollectingTime){
Update list of the neighbors (i.e. the nodes within the radio range);
Collect observed protocol events for every neighbor separately;
}else{
Transform the collected events into antigens;
Send antigens towards Virtual Thymus,i.e. into the Delay Buffer;
Send antigens to Clustering Block;
timerMB=0;
}//end if else
}//end while
// Danger Signal (DS) block
Initialize the variables;
While (TRUE){
Receive DS from other nodes that you overhear and store it;
if (experienced own packet loss){
Generate a DS and store it;
Send the danger signal over the route on which the loss happen;
}//end if
Delete stored DSs older then StoringTimeDS;
}//end while
// Bone Marrow block
isThereProdced=0;
While (TRUE){
if (!isThereProduced){
Produce a new random detector;
isThereProduced=1;
}//end if
}//end while
// Virtual Thymus (VT) block
Initialize the constants;
phaseVT=Initial;
numberOfImmatureDetectors=0;
ReserveDelayBufferSpace(DelayBufferSizeMax);
While (TRUE){
Accept the antigen into the Delay Buffer if room, otherwise drop it(){
if (there is a free space in the buffer) accept the antigen;
else if (the oldest antigen is delayed>AntigenTowardsVTMin)replace the oldest one;
else drop the antigen;
}//end Accept...()
Drop antigens from the Buffer if delayed more then AntigPresentTimeVT;
Drop antigens from the buffer if correlated with currently stored DSs;
if (phaseVT==Stationary){
Delete the antigens from the VT that are presented longer then AntigPresentTimeVT(){
do not delete more then currentNumberOfAntigensInDelayBuffer;
delete the oldest ones;
}//end Delete...()
while (numberOfAntigensInVT<MaxNumberOfAntigensVT){
Take the youngest enough delayed antigen from the the Delay Buffer, if any;
if (the antigen is not correlated with stored DSs){
Put the antigen into VT.
}else{
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Delete the antigen;
}//end if else
}//end while
while (numberOfNaiveDetectorsCS<MaxNumberNaive){
Receive new immature detector;
Negatively select new immature detector into naive;
if (not deleted) move naive detector into Clonal Selection block;
}//end while
}else{
while(numberOfImmatureDetectors<MaxNumberNaive){
Receive new immature detector;
}//end while
while (numberOfAntigensInVT<MaxNumberOfAntigensVT){
Take the youngest enough delayed antigen from the the Delay Buffer, if any;
if (the antigen is not correlated with stored DSs){
Put the antigen into VT.
}else{
Delete the antigen;
}//end if else
Negatively select the immature detectors in the thymus by new antigen;
while(numberOfImmatureDetectors<MaxNumberNaive){
Receive new immature detector;
Negatively select new immature detector with antigens in VT if any;
}//end while
if (numberOfAntigensInVT==MaxNumberOfAntigensVT){
PhaseVT=stationary;
Change state of immature detectors into naive;
Move naive detectors into Clonal Selection block;
while (numberOfNaiveDetectorsCS<MaxNumberNaive){
Receive new immature detector;
Negatively select new immature detector into naive one;
if (not deleted) move naive detector into Clonal Selection block;
}//end while
}//end if
}//end while
}//end if else
}//end while
// Clonal Selection block
Initialize the variables;
numberOfNaiveDetectorsCS=0;
While (TRUE){
///create naive detectors, do clonal selection, promote naive to memory
Delete naive detectors older then MaxNaiveTime;
Receive next matching event info for innate detectors, from Clustering block;
if (matchingEventIsReceived){
if (the matching is costimulated by DS){
score(corresponding naive detector)++;
if (score(corresponding naive detector)>TresholdCS){
score(corresponding naive detector)=0;
Make a copy of the detector;
Promote the detector into a memory detector;
Decide which one of the old memory detectors to delete(){
find set S of those that can detect last MemoryGroupingParameter ...
... antigens detected by the new detector before it became memory
if (the set S is not empty) {
from the set S, choose the one that is not used for ...
... the longest time;
}else{
from all old detectors, choose one that is not used for ...
... the longest time;
}//end if else
}// end Decide...()
Delete the chosen old memory detector;
Do randomly-flip-bits hypermutation for the detector copy (ProbaPerBit);
}//end if
}//end if
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matchingEventIsReceived=0;
}//end if
///test memory detectors
Receive next matching event info for memory detectors, from Clustering block;
if (the detector is not under testing){
if (DS is missing for the matching){
increase missingDSsCounter(the detector);
if (missingDSsCounter(the detector)== MemoryTestTrigger){
put the detector under testing;
}//end if
}//end if
}else{
// the detector is under testing
//for this detector next matches, form sets of mutually similar antigens
//first element of a set has a missing DS, other elements are similar to the first one
if (the DS is missing and testing sets are not formed){
form a testing set and put this antigen in it as a first element;
}else if (the antigen is different from a set first element in not more then one bit){
add the antigen to the set;
}else if (number of the sets formed<NumberOfTestSetsMax){
form a new testing set and put this antigen in it as a first element;
}//end if else
//testing a set corresponds to testing of the detector if it is probably self reactive
if (a test set length==MemoryDetTestSize){
if (more then MemoryDetConfidence \% of the set elements is missing DS){
delete this detector and all its test sets;
}//end if
}//end if
if (number of tested sets==NumberOfTestSetsMax/2){
stop testing this detector and delete all its testing sets;
}//end if
}//end if else
}//end while
// Clustering block
Initialize the variables;
While (TRUE){
Receive new antigen from the Mapping block;
Match antigen by memory detectors;
Store the matches within the time window DetByMemoryTimeWindow;
Apply clustering for matches by memory detectors(TetaMemory, AlfaMemory);
Match antigen by naive detectors;
Evaluate is there is a DS that costimulates the matching;
Store the matches within the time window DetByNaiveTimeWindow;
Apply clustering for costimulated matches by naive detectors(TetaNaive, AlfaNaive);
}//end while
